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WHAT DID INDIAN PHILOSOPHERS AGREE ON? 
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE 
TO THE SARVADARŚANASAṂGRAHA  
Johannes Bronkhorst 
  
Abstract · This article asks what qualified a view to be considered a darśana ‘philosophy’ in clas-
sical India. It focuses in particular on the 14th century text called Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha ‘Compen-
dium of  all philosophies’. It turns out that this text includes views that we would not call phil-
osophies (such as alchemy) but does not include Islamic philosophy, which must yet have been 
known (if  only by hearsay) to its author. Different possible answers are reviewed before reaching 
a conclusion. 
 
Keywords · Philosophy, darśana, Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha, Vijayanagara, liberation. 
  
ndia has a long tradition of  rational debate, in which representatives of  different 
schools of  philosophy confronted each other. These schools belonged primarily to 
three different socio-religious currents: Brahmanism, Buddhism and, to a lesser extent, 
Jainism. The antagonism between debaters was at times ferocious, the language to de-
scribe these confrontations warlike, and it appears that the consequences of  a lost de-
bate might on occasion be catastrophic. In other words, the debates might take place 
between sworn enemies, who yet bothered to listen to their opponents and present ar-
guments to refute their positions. Why did they do so? 
The answer to this question lies, at least in part, in the connection with political 
power. Ideally, inimical debates took place at the royal courts, if  possible in the presence 
of  the ruler. It was the ruler who could reward the winner and punish the loser. Win-
ning debates was particularly important in view of  the fact that religious institutions 
depended for their finances on political authorities. A major role was played by so-called 
agrahāras, ‘gifts’ of  land and its inhabitants to donees entitled to its produce, which they 
were supposed to use to dedicate themselves to their religious observances. These 
might include studying philosophy. Also Buddhist monastic establishments – including 
its big ‘universities’, such as Nālandā – depended on the surrounding villages to whose 
produce they were entitled. Arrangements like these provided a certain continuity over 
time, but clearly political rulers were free to change them when they felt like it. Debates 
were one of  the factors that might convince local rulers that they were betting on the 
right horse. 
Debates – and especially public debates – require a minimal acquaintance with the 
positions of  one’s opponents. Such acquaintance is reflected in the philosophical texts 
belonging to various schools, and clearly increased over time, being minimal at the be-
ginning. A very early ‘philosophical’ text, the Buddhist Kathāvatthu (latter half  of  the sec-
ond century BCE), criticizes rival Buddhist views, but does not appear to understand 
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them at all.1 Also in the following centuries, roughly until the sixth century of  the 
 Common Era, Buddhist texts were mainly concerned with rival Buddhist views, about 
which they were now better informed, but they only rarely mentioned Brahmanical 
schools of  thought; Brahmanical texts of  that period returned the compliment by ignor-
ing Buddhist views. It is only from the middle of  the first millennium CE onward that 
philosophical texts fully engage with each other. To quote Eltschinger (2012: 60 n. 143):  
With a few exceptions (Āryadeva’s Catuḥśataka, the pseudo-Nāgārjuna’s Vaidalyaprakaraṇa, dis-
cussions scattered throughout Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośabhāṣya), the Buddhists start criticis-
ing Brahmanical (and sporadically Jaina) philosophies systematically during the first half  of  the 
sixth century, or slightly earlier in the case of  Dignāga (Dignāga, Dharmapāla, Dharmakīrti, 
Bhāviveka, Guṇamati, Sagāthaka of  the Laṅkāvatārasūtra, etc.). The same seems to hold true of  
the Brahmanical philosophers’ critique of  Buddhist doctrines (Nyāyabhāṣya and Nyāyavārttika, 
Vṛttikāragrantha and especially [Ślokavārttika], Yuktidīpikā). More generally, sustained philosophi-
cal confrontation between Buddhists and non-Buddhists starts to be reflected in extant philo-
sophical literature from the beginning of  the sixth century onwards.  
It is also from this period onward that a new type of  text comes into being: surveys of  
different philosophies.2 By their nature, these texts concentrate on what different phil-
osophies do not agree on. However, by presenting those philosophies together, they also 
reveal what they have in common, at least from the point of  view of  the authors of  
these surveys. In the present article I will consider one of  these texts in particular: the 
Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha ‘Compendium of  all philosophies’, a presentation of  sixteen 
philosophies in sixteen chapters. 
The Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha was composed toward the end of  the fourteenth century, 
in the still young Vijayanagara Empire, situated in the south of  the subcontinent. The 
text claims to have been composed by Mādhava the son of  Sāyaṇa, but there are reasons 
to think that it was composed by the son – called Cannibhaṭṭa – of  this Mādhava’s 
teacher Sarvajñaviṣṇu. Moreover, it is possible or even probable that the final chapter, 
on Śaṅkara’s philosophy, had been composed by someone else.3 Whatever the details, 
the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha originated in surroundings that were close to royal power: 
both Sāyaṇa and his older brother Mādhava (different from Sāyaṇa’s son of  that name) 
had intimate links to the court.4 
This last detail is not without significance. At the time of  the Vijayanagara Empire, 
Islam had made major inroads into India, and various neighbouring rulers who were 
Muslims threatened its very existence. Indeed, its capital was going to be completely 
destroyed some two centuries later, after those neighbours had beaten its army. Islam 
was therefore hardly unknown to the intellectuals of  the Vijayanagara Empire. And yet, 
the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha completely ignores it. Assuming that its author knew that 
there was intellectual life also in Islam, how would he justify this omission? 
The example of  Islam suggests that there are views not dealt with in the Sarvadarśa -
nasaṃgraha that may yet have been known to its author. Does it merely mean that he 
did not agree with them? The answer must be no, for his book is full of  ideas with 
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1 Bronkhorst 1993. 
2 Mainly composed by Mādhyamika Buddhists, Śvetāmbara Jainas and Advaita Vedāntins; see Halbfass 1988, 
pp. 350-351, Qvarnström 1999, pp. 174. Qvarnström (1999, pp. 176) draws attention to an earlier doxography, 
Āryadeva’s Skhalitapramathanayukti-hetusiddhi (English translation by Clark & Jamspal 1979), but this one is of  an 
altogether different genre.             3 Bronkhorst forthcoming.             4 See, e.g., Galewicz 2009. 
which he did not agree. In an important sense, he did not agree with any of  the philos-
ophies he described, with the exception of  Advaita Vedānta (the chapter on which may 
not even be by his own hand). What qualified all these philosophies to be included in 
his book? Since its title proclaims that it deals with all philosophies, we must perhaps 
reformulate this question: What qualified a view to be considered a philosophy, a dar -
śana? This is the question to be addressed in this article. 
Let us consider some possibilities (most of  which we will refute below):  
– Philosophies associated with other religions do not count as darśana. 
– Philosophies produced or adhered to in politically inimical states do not count as 
darśana. 
– Philosophies produced by thinkers belonging to a lower social class do not count as 
darśana. 
– A darśana is and has to be expressed in Sanskrit. 
– Only old traditional systems of  thought can be accepted as darśanas. 
– Only systems of  thought that accept the authority of  the Veda and/or Purāṇas can 
be darśanas. 
– Darśanas accept the succession of  time cycles. 
– Darśanas aim at liberation.  
Let us look at these points one by one. 
 
1. Religious Affiliation  
This is perhaps the most natural way to try to explain what is and what is not included 
in the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha. Most of  its philosophies, one might be tempted to think, 
are Hindu philosophies. Indeed, we have the testimony of  perhaps the first Muslim visi-
tor to India to take a serious interest in its religious and philosophical traditions, Al-
Bīrūnī, who commented several centuries before the composition of  the Sarvadarśa -
nasaṃgraha that «we believe in nothing in which they believe, and vice versa» (Sachau 
1888, p. 19). We may assume that the author of  the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha had similar 
ideas about Muslim beliefs (if  he had any information about them at all). The question 
is whether he considered those beliefs more different from his own than the philos-
ophies of  Buddhism and Jainism and the philosophy of  Cārvāka, which he yet included 
in his compendium, and if  so, why.1 What is more, it is not even obvious that he looked 
upon the schools discussed in the other chapters as being part of  one religion, as being 
different expressions of  ‘Hinduism’. The view according which the Vijayanagara Em-
pire was a defensive bulwark of  Hinduism against the onslaught of  Islam has been 
shown to be overdrawn.2 The Vijayanagara Empire, for example, sometimes supported 
Islam, and this was not felt as a contradiction.3 Moreover, the religious traditions known 
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1 Romila Thapar’s (2018, p. 147-148) claim that «the author of  the compendium [i.e. the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha], 
Madhavacharya, states that although he personally did not subscribe to the Lokayata philosophy, others did, and 
so it had to be given recognition», besides overlooking the fact that this author did not subscribe to most of  the 
philosophies in his book, does not explain why Muslim thought is not even mentioned. 
2 See Lycett & Morrison 2013. 
3 «The early fifteenth-century court seems to have actively supported Islam, a fact made evident in Ahmad 
Khan’s having dedicated the founding of  a mosque in the capital city to his patron Devarāya II» (Stoker 2016, p. 
188, with a reference to Verghese 1995, p. 126). Olle Qvarnström’s (1999, p. 176) conjecture that «[the presence 
from inscriptions at Vijayanagara are not in close correspondence with the philosophies 
described in the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha. The chapter headings of  a study of  these in-
scriptions (Verghese 1995) give a good impression of  those religious traditions: Śaivite 
traditions (ch. 2); the Narasiṃha cult (ch. 3); the Rāmāyaṇa tradition (ch. 4); Kṛṣṇa and 
Viṭhala cults (ch. 5); Śrī-Vaiṣṇava traditions from the Tamil country (ch. 6); minor cults 
and popular religion (ch. 7); temples and festivals (ch. 8); ascetics, maṭhas and agrahāras 
(ch. 9); non-Hindu religions (ch. 10). From among these, the following are not dealt with 
in the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha: the Narasiṃha cult; the Rāmāyaṇa tradition; the Kṛṣṇa 
and Viṭhala cults; the minor cults and popular religion (Harihara, Caturviṃśatimūrtis 
and Daśāvatāras of  Viṣṇu, goddesses, Hanumān, Nāgas, Satīs and heroes); temples and 
festivals; maṭhas and agrahāras. From among this list, only Śaivaism, Śrī Vaiṣṇavism and 
some non-Hindu religions (Buddhism and Jainism) are dealt with, primarily in their 
most philosophical shape. Devotion (bhakti) appears here and there, most prominently 
in the chapter on the philosophy of  Rāmānuja, where devotion is central. 
 
2. Veda and Purāṇas  
We can be brief  about acceptance of  the authority of  the Veda as a requirement for 
being a darśana in the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha. It is not. The inclusion of  the Buddhist and 
Jaina philosophies as well as the philosophy of  Cārvāka shows this sufficiently. For the 
author of  the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha, also thinkers who rejected the authority of  the 
Veda could produce darśanas, worthy of  inclusion in his survey.1 
The same can be said about the Purāṇas, which played a unifying role in the making 
of  Hinduism (Bisschop 2018). They are not frequently referred to in the Sarvadarśa -
nasaṃgraha, not even in the ‘Hindu’ chapters. The most striking exception is chapter 
five, which presents the philosophy of  Madhva. Unfortunately, many of  the so-called 
references to different Purāṇas in this chapter are not real references at all: Madhva in-
vented them, as Roque Mesquita (2007) has shown. The other chapters sporadically 
refer to a Purāṇa. Where identifiable, all these references appear to be to one Purāṇa: 
the Viṣṇu Purāṇa. A passage in the final chapter suggests, moreover, that its author (who 
appears to be different from the author of  the preceding fifteen chapters) looked upon 
this Purāṇa as śruti, i.e. as a Vedic text with Vedic authority.2 
 
3. Political Considerations  
One might think that Islamic thought is ignored in the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha because 
it was associated with political entities, i.e. neighbouring Muslim states, that threatened 
the existence of  the Vijayanagara Empire. This would not be correct. The Sarvadarśa -
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of  Islam] may have functioned as an incentive to the composition of  doxographies introducing one’s own philos-
ophy (and others’) to adherents of  an ideology that was far more foreign than those with which it had coexisted 
in the past and that had not posed any immediate threat, either in a political or a religious sense» may therefore 
have to be read with caution. 
1 The Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha does not even distinguish between āstika philosophies that are Vedic, and nāstika 
ones that are non-Vedic; it appears to consider Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā a nāstika philosophy. See Bronkhorst forth-
coming a. 
2 Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha (ed. Abhyankar) ll. 16.771-773 appears to present a verse that occurs in the Viṣṇu Purāṇa 
(5.17.14) as śruti. Some of  the other chapters refer to the Viṣṇu Purāṇa by name. 
nasaṃgraha says nothing that might support (or refute) this idea. Moreover, a more re-
cent episode in the history of  Vijayanagara shows that bellicose confrontation did not 
stand in the way of  philosophical interaction. At the beginning of  the sixteenth century 
CE, King Kṛṣṇadevarāya of  Vijayanagara waged war with the state of  Kaliṅga. In spite 
of  this war, or perhaps because of  it, the ruler of  Kaliṅga sent Kṛṣṇadevarāya a philo-
sophical work accompanied by the challenge that his court pandit refute it.1 Philosophi-
cal confrontation was in this case an extension of  political confrontation. 
 
4. Social Class  
The Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha does not say that only twice-born people may produce phil-
osophy, and it seems unlikely that this was its silent presupposition. Some of  the schools 
it represents were critical of  the class-caste system, and some of  its texts may have been 
composed by authors who were not twice-born. This applies to Buddhism, Jainism and 
to the philosophy of  Cārvāka. 
 
5. Sanskrit  
The texts that are used or referred to in the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha are all in Sanskrit. It 
seems reasonable to assume that the author of  the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha was con-
vinced that there was no philosophy worth the name in languages other than Sanskrit 
and its cognates.2 It seems equally probable that he could not read texts in languages 
too different from Sanskrit (such as Arabic or Persian, associated with Muslim culture). 
This does not necessarily mean that he thought other philosophies had to be inferior – 
i.e., not darśanas – because they did not find expression in Sanskrit. He certainly does not 
say anything of  the kind. What is more, he cites authors who also wrote in other lan-
guages than Sanskrit, as, for example, Veṅkaṭanātha (quoted l. 4.204; equally known as 
Vedānta Deśika), who also wrote in Tamil.3 And his seventh chapter, which deals with 
the philosophy of  the followers of  Śiva (śaivadarśana), concerns what is better known 
by the name Śaiva-Siddhānta, which by that time had produced philosophical works in 
Tamil.4 Language in itself  can hardly have been a condition for being considered a 
darśana. Having said this, it is good to remember that the Vijayanagara Empire appears 
to have emphasized the use of  Sanskrit more than its predecessors. To quote Sheldon 
Pollock (2006, p. 337): «The Vijayanagara empire … saw a dramatic decrease in the pro-
duction of  expressive political inscription in Kannada (also in Telugu and Tamil), while 
a Sanskrit imperial idiom modestly reasserted itself». 
 
6. Ancient Systems  
It would be conceivable that the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha started from the assumption 
that anything of  philosophical value had been expressed ages ago, by the ancient sages 
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1 Bronkhorst, Diaconescu & Kulkarni 2013. 
2 He would then disagree with the following statement: «Indian philosophy has been written in many lan-
guages, including Pali, Prakrit, Sanskrit, Malayalam, Urdu, Gujerati, Tamil, Telugu, Bengali, Marathi, Persian, 
Kannada, Punjabi, Hindi, Tibetan, Arabic, and Assamese» (Ganeri 2017, p. 1). 
3 Freschi 2018. The Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha refers to some specific languages different from Sanskrit in its 15th 
chapter, where it mentions karṇāṭagauḍalāṭabhāṣā ‘the languages of  Karnataka, Bengal and Lāṭa’. 
4 Brunner 1981, p. 104. 
whose names are connected with the fundamental texts of  various schools.1 This does 
not however appear to be the case. Some of  the chapters carry the names of  individuals 
who lived just a few generations before the author of  the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha, and 
who he knew were historical figures belonging to a recent past. This is particularly true 
of  the chapters called after Rāmānuja (no. 4) and Pūrṇaprajña (= Madhva; no. 5). 
 Several modern scholars have been struck by this. Halbfass (1988, p. 353), for example, 
stated: «it is … remarkable that the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha steers clear of  the six-fold (as 
well as any other numerical) scheme, and also includes several doctrines that were con-
sidered quite modern at the time it was written. It is also interesting that this work 
makes a clear distinction between sectarian philosophies and the classical systems, set-
ting the former alongside the latter as something new». Stoker (2016, p. 72) adds: «These 
[systems that were of  relatively recent origin and often prevailed in the Sringeri 
Smārtas’ milieu] would include chapters on Rāmānuja’s thought, Madhva’s thought, 
and several different systems of  Śaivism». There was apparently place in the Sarvadarśa -
nasaṃgraha for recently developed philosophies. [A proviso must be added. Is it possible 
that the author of  the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha thought that these philosophies, though 
associated with recent names, had ancient roots? Stoker (2016, p. 77) points out that 
Madhva appears to say something of  the kind: «In Madhva’s Anuvyākhyāna 2.2, v. 549, 
a minicommentary on his own commentary on foundational Vedānta scriptures, the 
Brahma Sūtras, Madhva expresses the idea that all currents of  thought are, like streams 
of  water, beginningless».]2 
 
7. Cyclical Nature of Time  
One of  the characteristics that most ‘Hindu’ sects share with Buddhism and Jainism is 
their belief  in time cycles: long periods of  time at the end of  which the world begins all 
over again. It is tempting to think that the author of  the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha took this 
belief  for granted in the philosophers he was willing to take seriously. This temptation 
is not justified. Nowhere does the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha mention this particular belief. 
What is more, while discussing the philosophy of  Jaimini (= Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā; ch. 12), 
he quotes a verse from Kumārila’s Ślokavārttika (7.366) that states that there is a begin-
ningless and uninterrupted tradition of  handing down Vedic knowledge from teacher 
to pupil,3 which suggest that this particular school believed in an eternal and essentially 
unchanging world, not in time cycles. 
 
8. Liberation  
There is, finally, one topic that is referred to in most chapters of  the Sarvadarśana -
saṃgraha: liberation. It is even mentioned in the first chapter, dealing with the philos-
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1 This would agree with Qvarnström’s (1999, p. 174) following observation: «The most salient [generic prop-
erty of  the different doxographical texts] is their lack of  a historical point d’appui; the various philosophical strands 
are treated as once and for all fixed systems (siddhānta) and not as products of  history …». 
2 A note specifies: darśanānāṃ pravṛttatvān manda āśaṅkate punaḥ/ anādikālato vṛttāḥ samayāḥ hi pravāhataḥ/ 
«The fool doubts that [the darśanas] are streams that flow in [real] time in a continuous way from time that is be-
ginningless, because [he is confused] by the fact that the different darśanas are proclaimed [by specific individuals]». 
3 Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha l. 12 140-141: vedasyādhyayanaṃ sarvaṃ gurvadhyayanapūrvakam/ vedādhyayanasāmānyād 
adhunādhyayanaṃ yathā// «All study of  the Veda is preceded by a teacher’s study, because Vedic study is always the 
same, like study today». 
ophy of  Cārvāka, where its possibility is rejected.1 The chapter on Nyāya speaks of  the 
belief  that in the state of  liberation there is complete annihilation of  pain as established 
doctrine in all schools of  thought (sarvatantrasiddhāntasidddha).2 This belief  is here 
called ghaṇṭāpatha, lit. the chief  road in a village, and therefore a or the central notion in 
all these philosophies. Liberation is mentioned only in passing in the chapter on 
Vaiśeṣika, but in a manner that indicates that the role of  liberation (here: niḥśreyasa) is 
taken for granted; indeed, the very first lines of  this chapter emphasize the role that 
knowledge of  Vaiśeṣika plays on the path toward the end of  suffering. It is not men-
tioned in chapter 8, on the philosophy of  Pratyabhijñā, no doubt because the goal of  this 
philosophy, identity with the Highest Lord, here plays the role that liberation plays in 
the other chapters. The only real exception is chapter 12, on Jaimini’s philosophy, i.e. on 
Mīmāṃsā. And here one may suspect that the fundamental role of  ritual Mīmāṃsā with 
respect to all schools of  Vedānta – including the philosophy of  Rāmānuja (ch. 4), the phil-
osophy of  Madhva (ch. 5) and the philosophy of  Śaṅkara (ch. 16) – made it impossible to 
leave this school out.3 Moreover, ideas about liberation did enter ritual Mīmāṃsā, for 
example in the work of  the commentator Kumārila Bhaṭṭa,4 who is extensively referred 
to in the chapter on Jaimini’s philosophy, though not on the topic of  liberation.5 
We are therefore left with the question: Could it be that, in order to qualify for being 
a darśana, ideas have to include views on liberation? 
This seems to make sense. It is clearly not the case that all philosophies discussed in 
the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha say the same about liberation. Indeed, liberation can be con-
ceived of  in quite different ways. The liberated person is identical with Brahma in one 
of  them, separate from but associated with the Supreme Lord in another, completely 
on his own in a third, etc. etc. But liberation is a recurring theme in all. This seems to 
justify the conclusion that a philosophy is only worthy of  being included in the 
Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha, and is therefore one of  «all the darśanas» promised by its title, if  
it has a position with respect to liberation. 
This conclusion answers questions that might otherwise remain puzzling. It explains 
the absence of  Muslim thought. However little the author of  the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha 
may have known of  Muslim thought, it may have sufficed to convince him that it had 
no place for anything like liberation as conceived of  in Indian thought. It also explains 
the presence of  chapters dealing with ideas that we may not be inclined to call «philo-
sophical». A very clear example is the one dealing with «the philosophy of  the Lord of  
Mercury» (raseśvaradarśana; no. 9), which shows the way to attaining the perennity of  
the body (piṇḍasthairya) with the help of  mercury, i.e. by alchemical means. This per-
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1 Could this be an illustration of  Doniger’s (2018, p. 154) observation that «Indian philosophers kept the 
 Charvakas alive because the viewpoints attributed to them, satirically or not, disclosed hidden questions upon 
which much of  the Indian philosophical edifice reposed»? 
2 Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha l. 11.104-106: sarveṣāṃ mokṣavādinām apavargadaśāyām ātyantikī duḥkhanivṛttir astīty 
asyārthasya sarvatantrasiddhāntasidddhatayā ghaṇṭāpathatvāt/. In the then following lines the text illustrates this 
with the help of  an analysis of  the doctrines of  the Mādhyamikas, the Vijñānavādins, the Jainas, of  Cārvāka and 
of  Bhaṭṭa Sarvajña. 
3 Note in this connection that Mīmāṃsā is not included in certain early enumerations of  schools; see Gersch-
heimer 2007.                                                                                                                          4 See e.g. Mesquita 1994. 
5 Note that the chapters on Pratyabhijñā (ch. 8) and on Jaimini’s philosophy (ch. 12) do not use the expressions 
puruṣārtha (‘human goal’) either, unlike virtually all other chapters. Liberation is, of  course, the highest human 
goal (paramapuruṣārtha). 
ennity of  the body is here called jīvanmukti ‘liberation-in-life’; the chapter uses this ex-
pression in a way quite different from other thinkers (see below). Liberation of  sorts 
clearly plays a central role, even in this chapter. 
This expression ‘liberation-in-life’ is only used in the chapter on alchemy. This is pe-
culiar. The author of  the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha must have been aware of  the existence 
of  the book called Jīvanmuktiviveka ‘Investigation of  Liberation-in-Life’, or at the very 
least of  the ideas promulgated therein. This Jīvanmuktiviveka was composed by 
Mādhava the older brother of  Sāyaṇa (after he had adopted the name Vidyāraṇya upon 
taking saṃnyāsa). This Mādhava was the uncle of  the author of  the Sarvadarśana -
saṃgraha or at least, if  Cannibhaṭṭa was indeed its author, someone he knew or knew 
about. There is evidence that the author of  the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha was closely ac-
quainted with at least one earlier work of  this Mādhava: Its chapter on the philosophy 
of  Jaimini (i.e., Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā) shows the influence of  the latter’s Jaiminīyanyāyamā -
lāvistara.1 And yet, the notion of  liberation-in-life as dealt with in the Jīvanmuktiviveka 
– i.e. liberation before death, but different from the perennity of  the body – is absent 
from the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha. Only the chapter on alchemy mentions the terms 
jīvanmukta and jīvanmukti several times, but uses these in an altogether different 
manner, as we have seen.2 This same chapter specifies that in all other philosophies (as 
it puts it: in all six philosophies) liberation takes place after death.3 This last claim is his-
torically incorrect. Some earlier authors, among them Śaṅkara himself, knew the no-
tion of  liberation before death and used the expression jīvanmukti to refer to it.4 How-
ever, the author of  the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha does not correct this claim, neither here 
nor elsewhere in his book. Liberation tout court, on the other hand, is a frequent topic, 
as we have seen. We cannot but conclude that the ideas of  Mādhava/Vidyāraṇya had 
not convinced him. 
The above claim as to the absence of  the term jīvanmukti in all chapters of  the 
Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha with the exception of  the chapter on alchemy has been chal-
lenged. According to Raffaele Torella (1980, p. 409), the word did originally occur in 
chapter 8, which deals with the philosophy of  pratyabhijñā. In his study of  this chapter, 
Torella points out that parts of  it have been taken verbatim from other works, including 
the Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī of  Abhinavagupta. On the basis of  that text, he proposes 
to emend a passage of  the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha that does not contain the word 
jīvanmukti in such a manner that it now does contain this word. 
Torella’s proposal cannot be accepted for the simple reason that the passage as it oc-
curs in all editions of  the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha makes perfect sense.5 Rather than 
emending the text, we have occasion to observe that, to all appearances, the author of  
the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha modified the wording of  the Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī in 
such a manner that the word jīvanmukti does not occur in his own text. In other words, 
he consciously avoided this term. 
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1 Kurata 1994. 
2 This chapter quotes many verses from the Rasārṇava, an alchemical text that promises jīvanmukti in the form 
of  an immortal body through the use of  mercury. 
3 Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha (ed. Abhyankar) l. 9.11: ṣaṭsv api darśaneṣu dehapātānantaraṃ mukter uktatayā «Because 
it has been stated in all the six philosophies that liberation takes place after the death of  the body». 
4 See Oberhammer 1994, pp. 15-17; Fort 1991, p. 2015; Slaje 1986; 2000, p. 172. 
5 For details, see the Appendix to my article The Vaiśeṣika Path to Liberation in Context (in preparation). 
How can we make sense of  the fact that the author of  the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha ig-
nored ideas about liberation-in-life that were so close to his own concern with liber-
ation, ideas that were being developed under his nose, so to say? One reason may be 
that the Jīvanmuktiviveka «departs from the mainstream Advaita of  Śaṅkara by prescrib-
ing in addition to knowledge a further program of  yogic discipline based on such texts 
as the Bhagavad Gītā …, the Pātañjala Yogasūtras …, the Gauḍapādīya Kārikās …, and 
the Laghu-Yogavāsiṣṭha … He integrates the structures of  thought from the Śaṅkaran 
Advaita and the Pātañjalīya Yoga systems into one system bearing on the life and goal 
of  the renouncer». (Goodding 2002, pp. 1-2). This may not have been to the taste of  the 
author of  the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha. It is also not impossible that the Jīvanmuktiviveka, 
which appears to be a product of  its author’s last years (Sprockhoff 1964, p. 225), had not 
yet been composed at the time of  the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha. 
However, perhaps the most important reason for the absence of  liberation-in-life in 
the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha may be the following: The Jīvanmuktiviveka and its ideas had 
a political dimension. By establishing the possibility of  liberation-in-life within the Ad-
vaita tradition and criticizing the rejection of  this possibility by the followers of  
Viśiṣṭādvaita, Mādhava/Vidyāraṇya emphasized the superiority of  his own (Advaita) 
tradition, and the special spiritual status of  its gurus.1 Stoker (2016, p. 61) describes the 
situation as follows:  
By regarding many of  their monastic heads as having achieved this state [of  jīvanmukti], Smārta 
Advaitins implicitly claimed a particularly authoritative spiritual status for their religious leaders. 
In a paradoxical way, the sect extended its worldly influence through the presumed liberation of  
their leader from this world. Śaṅkara (c. eighth century) and especially Vimuktātman (c. tenth-
eleventh century) each argued for the necessity of  a qualified teacher to achieve mokṣa and 
strongly implied that the most qualified teacher would be one who is in the state of  mokṣa him-
self. We should not then find it surprising that, as proponents of  the Advaita tradition became 
organized into monastic institutions, leading teachers in these communities came to be regarded 
as jīvanmuktas.  
A response to this challenge came more than a century later, when another form of  
Vedānta, Dvaita Vedānta, inspired by the teachings of  Madhva, had come to predomi-
nate in the Vijayanagara Empire. Its mouthpiece was Vyāsatīrtha.2 Vyāsatīrtha argued 
that jīvanmuktas have their place in Dvaita Vedānta as much as, if  not more than, in Ad-
vaita Vedānta.3 
Whatever the details of  this later development, what interests us at present is that 
the introduction of  liberation-in-life in the Jīvanmuktiviveka, i.e. liberation before death, 
was not politically innocent. Is it possible that the author of  the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha, 
in spite of  his preference for Advaita Vedānta, did not wish to be involved in this politi-
cal drama? It cannot be denied that the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha would be a very different 
work if  its preference for Advaita Vedānta was not, or not exclusively, based on argu-
ments that support it, but rather on the claim that liberation-in-life is its exclusive 
 privilege. 
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1 Goodding 2002, p. 19; Stoker 2016, p. 55. Goodding points out that Vidyāraṇya may have countered criticism 
with respect to the Advaita notion of  jīvanmukti from the side of  Vedānta Deśika. 
2 Also known as Vyāsarāya. This is the name under which he and his works are discussed in the relevant volume 
of  the Encyclopedia of  Indian Philosophies (Potter 2016, p. 380 ff.) 
3 For details, see Stoker 2016, p. 61.
 
Where does all this leave us with respect to the question what Indian philosophers agreed 
on? Judging by the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha, there were few if  any topics about which all 
philosophers agreed. However, all the philosophies considered worthy of  inclusion in 
this book agreed that liberation was a central concern, whatever precise interpretation 
is given to it. 
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